Bond German Bank AG [London Branch] 3.09% ( XS1232526167 ) in NOK

Issuer German Bank AG [London Branch]
Market price refresh price now   100 %  ⇌ 
Country  Germany
ISIN code  XS1232526167 ( in NOK )
Interest rate 3.09% per year ( payment 1 time a year)
Maturity 20/05/2025



Prospectus brochure of the bond Deutsche Bank AG [London Branch] XS1232526167 en NOK 3.09%, maturity 20/05/2025


Minimal amount 100 NOK
Total amount 1 000 000 000 NOK
Next Coupon 20/05/2025 ( In 19 days )
Detailed description Deutsche Bank AG [London Branch] is a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG, operating as a full-service bank in London offering a wide range of financial services including investment banking, corporate banking, and private wealth management.

The Bond issued by German Bank AG [London Branch] ( Germany ) , in NOK, with the ISIN code XS1232526167, pays a coupon of 3.09% per year.
The coupons are paid 1 time per year and the Bond maturity is 20/05/2025










Registration Document
for Secondary Issuances of Non-Equity Securities
6 April 2020
_______________
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft
(Frankfurt am Main, Federal Republic of Germany)
This document constitutes a registration document for secondary issuances of non-equity securities (the
"Registration Document"), which has been prepared by Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft ("Deutsche
Bank AG" or "Deutsche Bank" or the "Bank" or the "Issuer" or "we" or "our") pursuant to Art. 6 (3) and
Art. 14 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as amended from time to time (the "Prospectus Regulation") and
Art. 9 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980.
This Registration Document has been approved by the Commission de Surveil ance du Secteur Financier
(the "CSSF") of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg as competent authority under the Prospectus Regulation
in line with the provisions of Article 6 (4) of the Luxembourg Law on Prospectuses for securities. In
accordance with Article 25 (1) of the Prospectus Regulation, the Issuer has requested the CSSF to
provide the competent authority in Germany with a certificate of approval attesting that this Registration
Document has been drawn up in accordance with the Prospectus Regulation (a "Notification"). The
Issuer may request the CSSF to provide competent authorities in additional member states within the
European Economic Area (the "EEA") with further Notifications.
This Registration Document wil be valid for a period of twelve months following the date of its approval
and wil expire on 6 April 2021. It reflects the status as of its date of approval. The obligation to
supplement this Registration Document pursuant to Art. 23 of the Prospectus Regulation in the event of a
significant new factor, material mistake or material inaccuracy shall not apply once this Registration
Document is no longer valid.
This Registration Document and all documents incorporated by reference in this Registration Document
will be published in electronic form on the website of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange (www.bourse.lu)
and on the website of the Issuer (www.db.com under "Investor Relations", "Creditor Information",
"Prospectuses", "Registration Documents").
This Registration Document does not constitute an offer of or an invitation by or on behalf of Deutsche
Bank to subscribe for or purchase any securities and should not be considered as a recommendation by
Deutsche Bank that any recipient of this Registration Document should subscribe for or purchase any
securities Deutsche Bank may issue. No person has been authorized by Deutsche Bank to give any
information or to make any representation other than those contained in this Registration Document or
consistent with this Registration Document. If given or made, any such information or representation
should not be relied upon as having been authorized by Deutsche Bank.




TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Risk Factors ................................................................................................................................................. 3
Risks Relating to the Macroeconomic, Geopolitical and Market Environment .......................................... 3
Risks Relating to Our Business and Strategy ............................................................................................ 7
Risks Relating to Regulation and Supervision ......................................................................................... 14
Risks Relating to Our Internal Control Environment ................................................................................ 23
Risks Relating to Litigation, Regulatory Enforcement Matters and Investigations .................................. 25
Risks relating to Nontraditional Credit Business, Accounting, Risk Management and Operations,
Benchmark Reforms ................................................................................................................................ 26
Persons Responsible, Third Party Information and Competent Authority Approval ......................... 32
Statutory Auditors ..................................................................................................................................... 32
Information about Deutsche Bank ........................................................................................................... 32
Business Overview .................................................................................................................................... 33
Trend Information ...................................................................................................................................... 35
Statement of no Material Adverse Change .............................................................................................. 35
Statement of no Significant Change in Financial Performance ............................................................... 35
Recent Developments .............................................................................................................................. 35
Outlook ..................................................................................................................................................... 35
Administrative, Management and Supervisory Bodies and Senior Management .............................. 41
Major Shareholders ................................................................................................................................... 44
Financial Information Concerning Deutsche Bank's Assets and Liabilities, Financial Position and
Profits and Losses .................................................................................................................................... 45
Financial Statements ............................................................................................................................... 45
Auditing of Annual Financial Information ................................................................................................. 45
Legal and Arbitration Proceedings.......................................................................................................... 45
Statement of no Significant Change in Financial Position ....................................................................... 64
Regulatory Disclosures ............................................................................................................................ 65
Material Contracts ..................................................................................................................................... 65
Documents Available ................................................................................................................................ 65
Information Incorporated by Reference .................................................................................................. 65
Appendix 1 ­ Information for the purposes of Art. 26(4) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 ............. 67
2




RISK FACTORS
This section describes the specific risks with regard to Deutsche Bank that affect its ability to meet its
obligations as issuer of debt securities.
The risk factors are divided into six categories, each indicated in this section by a title (in bold italic font),
according to their nature. Within the different categories, each individual risk factor is indicated by a
heading (in bold regular font) with the most significant risks being listed first in each category. The
assessment of materiality was made based on the probability of their occurrence and the expected extent
of their negative impact on the ability to meet the obligations as issuer of debt securities.
Investors should consider the following specific and material risk factors, in addition to the other
information and risk factors contained in the relevant simplified prospectus, when deciding to purchase
securities of Deutsche Bank.
The occurrence of the following risks may have a material adverse effect on the net assets, financial
position, and results of operations of Deutsche Bank and thus impair its ability to fulfil its obligations under
debt securities to investors.
Risks Relating to the Macroeconomic, Geopolitical and Market Environment
Macroeconomic and financial market conditions: As a global investment bank with a large private
client franchise, our businesses are materially affected by global macroeconomic and financial market
conditions. Significant risks exist that could negatively affect the results of operations and financial
condition in some of our businesses as well as our strategic plans, including deterioration of the economic
outlook for the euro area and slowing in emerging markets, trade tensions between the United States and
China as well between the United States and Europe, inflation risks, geopolitical risks and risks posed by
the COVID 19 pandemic.
In 2019, the global economy slowed markedly due to the adverse effects of trade-related and geopolitical
uncertainties. Global manufacturing output experienced a slowdown thereby depressing investment in
machinery and equipment. Trade tensions between the U.S. and China as well as between the U.S. and
Europe weighed significantly on global trade. But towards the end of 2019, the most important downside
risks had moderated somewhat. The announcement to seek a phased trade agreement between the U.S.
and China led to more favorable financial conditions and improved growth prospects. Constructive
developments regarding Brexit have added to this positive drift. Overall, global economic growth slowed to
3.1 % in 2019, after 3.8 % in 2018. Global inflation was 3.0 % in 2019. In the industrialized countries, GDP
grew by 1.7 % and consumer prices rose by 1.4 % while GDP of emerging market economies increased
by 4.0 % and inflation reached 4.0 %.
The euro area economy was adversely affected by the slowing of international trade as well as by the fear
of a hard Brexit and temporary effects in some member states. In particular, manufacturing output of
export-oriented economies declined, while the more domestic oriented services sectors held up well.
Growth was supported by domestic demand underpinned by solid income growth and easy financial
conditions. Monetary policy remained accommodative as the European Central Bank ("ECB") reinitiated
its net asset purchase program at a monthly pace of 20 billion by November 2019. Overall, the euro area
economy expanded by 1.2 % and consumer prices rose by 1.2 % in 2019. Due to the industrial recession
caused by the external headwinds, German economic growth more than halved to 0.6 %. The services
and construction sectors continued to support growth, as well as private consumption, driven by a tight
labor market and solid wage growth.
The U.S. economy showed solid performance in 2019. Driven by fiscal spending as well as supportive
financial conditions and consumer spending, backed by wage growth and a tight labor market, U.S. GDP
3




grew by 2.3 % in 2019. Nevertheless, trade uncertainty weighed on manufacturing output and thus
reduced capex investments. The inflation rate reached 1.8 % in 2019. The U.S. central bank's monetary
policy supported economic activity by cutting its policy rate three times in 2019.
Japan's GDP grew by 0.7 % in 2019, following 0.3 % for 2018. Activity in the manufacturing industry had
weakened due to the slowdown in overseas economies. Slower employment growth, cuts in overtime work
hours and the consumption tax have weighed on consumption growth. Against this backdrop, the inflation
rate fell to 0.5 % in 2019, after 1.0 % in 2018.
In 2019, emerging markets GDP grew by 4.0 %. Emerging Asia economies expanded by 5.3 % as they
were heavily affected by the slowdown of global trade. This is particularly true for the smaller, more open
economies. In China, GDP grew by 6.1 %. Economic activity slowed due to adverse impacts of U.S. tariffs
and weaker world trade in general, but tax cuts and infrastructure spending supported economic activity.
Chinese inflation edged higher to 2.9 % in 2019.
There are a number of global economic and political risks that could jeopardize global, regional and
national economies. Challenges in containing the COVID 19 pandemic or a more severe global spread
could considerably dampen economic momentum further. Despite the signing of the `Phase One' trade
agreement between the U.S. and China in January 2020, further trade conflicts including upcoming trade
negotiations between the U.S. and the European Union (EU) could negatively impact the global economic
outlook. The introduction of car duties on EU exports to the U.S. would have a negative impact on EU
industrial production, especially in Germany. Following Brexit, the United Kingdom ("UK") has entered into
a transition period with the EU that is expected to expire at the end of 2020. During 2020, the focus will be
on the UK's future trading relationship with the EU with the risk that both parties are unable to reach a
trade deal before the end of the transition period. In the eurozone, the government debt burden in some
countries, especially in Italy, is a risk due to the fragile political situation. We expect fiscal stimulus
proposals from the upcoming U.S. elections, the extent of which, however, will depend on the
Congressional composition. Additional y, rising geopolitical tensions, particularly in the Middle East could
create further uncertainty.
If these risks materialize, or current negative conditions persist or worsen, our business, results of
operations or strategic plans could be adversely affected.
COVID 19 pandemic: We are subject to global economic, market and business risks with respect to the
current COVID 19 pandemic.
The current COVID 19 pandemic is expected to have a negative impact on global, regional and national
economies and to disrupt supply chains and otherwise reduce international trade and business activity.
Reflecting this, the COVID 19 pandemic has already in February and March 2020 caused the levels of
equity and other financial markets to decline sharply and to become volatile, and such effects may
continue or worsen in the future. This may in turn reduce the level of activity in which certain of our
businesses operate and thus have a negative impact on such businesses' ability to generate revenues or
profits. If the pandemic is prolonged and/or extends more widely to countries around the world this could
amplify the current negative demand and supply chain effects as well as the negative impact on global
growth and global financial markets. Additionally, despite the business continuity and crisis management
policies currently in place, travel restrictions or potential impacts on personnel may disrupt our business.
In addition, a substantial proportion of our assets and liabilities comprise financial instruments that we
carry at fair value, with changes in fair value recognized in our income statement. The market declines
and volatility could negatively impact the value of such financial instruments and cause us to incur losses.
4




The economic slowdown and market downturn could also negatively impact specific portfolios through
negative ratings migration and higher than expected loan losses.
The current COVID 19 pandemic and its potential impact on the global economy may affect our ability to
meet our financial targets. While it is too early for us to predict the impacts on our business or our financial
targets that the expanding pandemic, and the governmental responses to it, may have, we may be
materially adversely affected by a protracted downturn in local, regional or global economic conditions. In
that situation, we would need to take action to ensure we meet our minimum capital objectives. These
actions or measures may result in adverse effects on our business, results of operations or strategic plans
and targets, or the prices of our securities.
European Union: In the European Union, continued elevated levels of political uncertainty could have
unpredictable consequences for the financial system and the greater economy, and could contribute to
European de-integration in certain areas, potentially leading to declines in business levels, write-downs of
assets and losses across our businesses. Our ability to protect ourselves against these risks is limited.
The last several years have been characterized by increased political uncertainty as Europe in particular
has been impacted by the European sovereign debt crisis, the withdrawal of the UK from the European
Union ("Brexit"), Italian political and economic developments, protests in France, the refugee crisis and
the increasing attractiveness to voters of populist and anti-austerity movements. Negotiations of the future
trade relationship between the UK and European Union in the transition period following Brexit could
aggravate the already uncertain economic outlook in the UK and Europe and hamper growth. Although the
severity of the European debt crisis appeared to have abated somewhat over recent years as the actions
by the ECB, the rescue packages and the economic recovery appeared to have stabilized the situation in
Europe, political uncertainty has nevertheless continued to be at an elevated level in recent periods and
could trigger unwinding of aspects of European integration that have benefitted our businesses. Against
this backdrop, the prospects for national structural reform and further integration among EU member
states, both viewed as important tools to reduce the eurozone's vulnerabilities to future crises, appear to
have worsened. These trends may ultimately result in material reductions in our business levels as our
customers rein in activity levels in light of decreased economic output and increased uncertainty, which
would materially adversely affect our operating results and financial condition. An escalation of political
risks could have consequences both for the financial system and the greater economy as a whole,
potentially leading to declines in business levels, write-downs of assets and losses across our businesses.
In addition, in a number of EU member states which had national elections in recent years, including
France, Germany and the Netherlands, political parties disfavoring current levels of European integration,
or espousing the unwinding of European integration to varying extents, have attracted support. Brexit has
also given a voice to some of these political parties to chal enge European integration. The resulting
uncertainty could have significant effects on the value of the euro and on prospects for member states'
financial stability, which in turn could potential y lead to a significant deterioration of the sovereign debt
market, especially if Brexit or any other member country's exit did not result in the strongly adverse effects
on the exiting country that many have predicted. If one or more members of the eurozone defaults on their
debt obligations or decides to leave the common currency, this would result in the reintroduction of one or
more national currencies. Should a eurozone country conclude it must exit the common currency, the
resulting need to reintroduce a national currency and restate existing contractual obligations could have
unpredictable financial, legal, political and social consequences, leading not only to significant losses on
sovereign debt but also on private debt in that country. Given the highly interconnected nature of the
financial system within the eurozone, and the high levels of exposure we have to public and private
counterparties around Europe, our ability to plan for such a contingency in a manner that would reduce
our exposure to non-material levels is likely to be limited. If the overall economic climate deteriorates as a
5




result of one or more departures from the eurozone, our businesses could be adversely affected, and, if
overall business levels decline or we are forced to write down significant exposures among our various
businesses, we could incur substantial losses.
Brexit: The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union ­ Brexit ­ may have adverse
effects on our business, results of operations or strategic plans.
The UK left the European Union on 31 January 2020. Relationships of the UK with Member States of the
European Union are subject to a transition period until 31 December 2020 under a withdrawal agreement.
The withdrawal agreement allows us to operate our business in the UK during the transition period as if
the UK were still a Member State. During the transition period, the European Union and the UK will be
negotiating the terms regarding trade and other relations between them. The UK Government aims to
complete a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union during 2020 which would come into effect on
31 January 2021. Any areas where agreement is not reached or alternative arrangement not made would
be subject to World Trade Organization Rules from this date. However, there remains the risk that a trade
deal is not reached in time.
Given the ongoing uncertainty over the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, it is difficult to
determine the exact impact on us over the long term. However, the UK's economy and those of the
eurozone countries are very tightly linked as a result of EU integration projects other than the euro, and
the scale of our businesses in the UK ­ especial y those dependent on activity levels in the City of London,
to which we are heavily exposed and which may deteriorate as a result of Brexit ­ means that even
modest effects in percentage terms can have a very substantial adverse effect on our businesses. Brexit
without an appropriate agreement between the European Union and the UK following the transition period
could, in particular, lead to a disruption of the provision of cross-border financial services. Also, failure to
reach such agreement may lead to greater costs to reorganize part of our business than would have been
the case with an agreed phase-in solution and may restrict our ability to provide financial services to and
from the UK. The currently unsettled future relationship between the EU and the UK is also likely to lead to
further uncertainty in relation to the regulation of cross-border business activities.
Also, after the expiry of transition period, Deutsche Bank AG is planning to continue to provide banking
and other financial services on a cross-border basis into the UK as well as through its London branch,
which it will retain. Deutsche Bank AG wil then be subject to additional regulatory requirements in the UK,
and its activities in the UK will be supervised and monitored by both the Prudential Regulatory Authority
("PRA") and the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA"). Deutsche Bank AG is already in the process of
applying for authorization to provide banking and other financial services in the United Kingdom after the
expiry of the transition period. However, Brexit has impacted the structure and business model of our UK
operations, and we will need to complete during 2020 the implementation of the governance structure and
business controls necessary to comply with new authorization requirements. Despite our preparations, as
a result of Brexit, our business, results of operations or strategic plans could be adversely affected.
European sovereign debt crisis: We may be required to take impairments on our exposures to the
sovereign debt of European or other countries if the European sovereign debt crisis reignites. The credit
default swaps into which we have entered to manage sovereign credit risk may not be available to offset
these losses.
The effects of the sovereign debt crisis have been especial y evident in the financial sector, as a large
portion of the sovereign debt of eurozone countries is held by European financial institutions, including
Deutsche Bank. As of 31 December 2019, we had a direct sovereign credit risk exposure of 6.2 billion to
Italy, 1.2 bil ion to Spain, 437 mil ion to Greece. 265 mil ion to Ireland and 228 mil ion to Portugal.
6




Despite the apparent abatement of the crisis in recent years, it remains uncertain whether, in light of the
current political environment, Greece or other eurozone sovereigns, such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and
Cyprus, will be able to manage their debt levels in the future and whether Greece wil attempt to
renegotiate its past international debt restructuring. The rise of anti-austerity parties and populist
sentiment in many of these countries poses a threat to the medium- to long-term measures recommended
for these countries to al eviate the tensions in the eurozone caused by drastically differing economic
situations among the eurozone states. In the future, negotiations or exchanges similar to the Greek debt
restructuring in 2012 could take place with respect to the sovereign debt of these or other affected
countries. The outcome of any negotiations regarding changed terms (including reduced principal
amounts or extended maturities) of sovereign debt may result in additional impairments of assets on our
balance sheet. Any negotiations are highly likely to be subject to political and economic pressures that we
cannot control, and we are unable to predict their effects on the financial markets, on the greater economy
or on ourselves.
In addition, any restructuring of outstanding sovereign debt may result in potential losses for us and other
market participants that are not covered by payouts on hedging instruments that we have entered into to
protect against the risk of default. These instruments largely consist of credit default swaps, general y
referred to as CDSs, pursuant to which one party agrees to make a payment to another party if a credit
event (such as a default) occurs on the identified underlying debt obligation. A sovereign restructuring that
avoids a credit event through voluntary write-downs of value may not trigger the provisions in CDSs we
have entered into, meaning that our exposures in the event of a write-down could exceed the exposures
we previously viewed as our net exposure after hedging. Additional y, even if the CDS provisions are
triggered, the amounts ultimately paid under the CDSs may not correspond to the full amount of any loss
we incur. We also face the risk that our hedging counterparties have not effectively hedged their own
exposures and may be unable to provide the necessary liquidity if payments under the instruments they
have written are triggered. This may result in systemic risk for the European banking sector as a whole
and may negatively affect our business and financial position.
We are also subject to other global macroeconomic and political risks, including with respect to the Middle
East.
The escalation of tensions in the Middle East is another important political risk, which came into focus in
light of a brief US-Iran military escalation in January 2020. A full scale conflict would lead to a sharp
increase in oil prices and affect oil dependent industries (such as Automotives, Chemicals, Aviation).
Ensuing turbulence in global financial markets would impact risky assets and countries. Taken together, a
full blown conflict would lead to a substantial slowdown in the global economy and diminish our ability to
generate revenues and the profitability on specific portfolios as wel as result in higher than expected loan
losses. Despite the business continuity and crisis management policies currently in place, a regional
conflict could pose challenges related to a potential personnel evacuation as well as loss of business
continuity, which may disrupt our business and lead to material losses.
Risks Relating to Our Business and Strategy
Business environment and strategic decisions: Our results of operation and financial condition
continue to be negatively impacted by the chal enging market environment, uncertain macroeconomic and
geopolitical conditions, lower levels of client activity, increased competition and regulation, and the
immediate impact of our strategic decisions. If we are unable to improve our profitability as we continue to
face these headwinds, we may be unable to meet many of our strategic aspirations, and may have
difficulty maintaining capital, liquidity and leverage at levels expected by market participants and our
regulators.
7




In 2019, revenues in our Investment and Private Bank corporate divisions declined and results in our
Corporate Bank and Asset Management corporate divisions were essential y flat, reflecting the negative
impact of a chal enging market environment characterized by low interest rates and low volatility, uncertain
macroeconomic and geopolitical conditions, lower levels of client activity and increased competition and
regulation. The ultra-low interest rate environment, especial y in the eurozone, has put pressure on our
margins in our traditional banking business and our trading and markets businesses. Additional y, the low
volatility in the market has had a negative impact on our trading and client-driven businesses that may
perform well in more volatile environments.
Changes in our business mix towards lower-margin, lower-risk products can limit our opportunities to profit
from volatility. Regulators have general y encouraged the banking sector to focus more on the facilitation
of client flow and less on risk taking. This has been effected in part by increasing capital requirements for
higher-risk activities. In addition, some of our regulators have encouraged or welcomed changes to our
business perimeter, consistent with their emphasis on lower-risk activities for banks. In recent years we
have reduced our exposure to a number of businesses that focused on riskier but more capital-intensive
products (but that in earlier periods also had the potential to be more highly profitable). Further pressure
on our revenues and profitability has resulted from long-term structural trends driven by regulation
(especial y increased regulatory capital, leverage and liquidity requirements and increased compliance
costs) and competition that have further compressed our margins in many of our businesses. Should a
combination of these factors continue to lead to reduced margins and subdued activity levels in our trading
and markets business over the longer term, this could impair our ability to reach out financial targets.
Although we have in current years made considerable progress resolving litigation, enforcement and
similar matters broadly within our established reserves, this pattern may not continue. In particular, these
costs could substantial y exceed the level of provisions that we established for our litigation, enforcement
and similar matters, which can contribute to negative market perceptions about our financial health,
costing us business. This, combined with the actual costs of litigation, enforcement and other matters,
could in turn adversely affect our ability to maintain capital, liquidity and leverage at levels expected by
market participants and our regulators.
Market conditions: Adverse market conditions, asset price deteriorations, volatility and cautious investor
sentiment have affected and may in the future materially and adversely affect our revenues and profits,
particularly in our investment banking, brokerage and other commission- and fee-based businesses. As a
result, we have in the past incurred and may in the future incur significant losses from our trading and
investment activities.
As a global investment bank, we have significant exposure to the financial markets and are more at risk
from adverse developments in the financial markets than are institutions engaged predominantly in
traditional banking activities. Sustained market declines have in the past caused and can in the future
cause our revenues to decline, and, if we are unable to reduce our expenses at the same pace, can cause
our profitability to erode or cause us to show material losses. Volatility can also adversely affect us, by
causing the value of financial assets we hold to decline or the expense of hedging our risks to rise.
Reduced customer activity can also lead to lower revenues in our "flow" business.
Specifical y, our investment banking revenues, in the form of financial advisory and underwriting fees,
directly relate to the number and size of the transactions in which we participate and are susceptible to
adverse effects from sustained market downturns. These fees and other income are generally linked to
the value of the underlying transactions and therefore can decline with asset values. In addition, periods of
market decline and uncertainty tend to dampen client appetite for market and credit risk, a critical driver of
transaction volumes and investment banking revenues, especial y transactions with higher margins. In
8




recent and other times in the past, decreased client appetite for risk has led to lower levels of activity and
lower levels of profitability in our Investment Bank corporate division. Our revenues and profitability could
sustain material adverse effects from a significant reduction in the number or size of debt and equity
offerings and merger and acquisition transactions.
Market downturns also have led and may in the future lead to declines in the volume of transactions that
we execute for our clients and, therefore, to declines in our noninterest income. In addition, because the
fees that we charge for managing our clients' portfolios are in many cases based on the value or
performance of those portfolios, a market downturn that reduces the value of our clients' portfolios or
increases the amount of withdrawals reduces the revenues we receive from our asset management and
private banking businesses. Even in the absence of a market downturn, below-market or negative
performance by our investment funds may result in increased withdrawals and reduced inflows, which
would reduce the revenue we receive. While our clients would be responsible for losses we incur in taking
positions for their accounts, we may be exposed to additional credit risk as a result of their need to cover
the losses where we do not hold adequate collateral or cannot realize it. Our business may also suffer if
our clients lose money and we lose the confidence of clients in our products and services.
In addition, the revenues and profits we derive from many of our trading and investment positions and our
transactions in connection with them can be directly and negatively impacted by market prices. In each of
the product and business lines in which we enter into these trading and investment positions, part of our
business entails making assessments about the financial markets and trends in them. When we own
assets, market price declines can expose us to losses. Many of the more sophisticated transactions of our
Investment Bank corporate division are influenced by price movements and differences among prices. If
prices move in a way we have not anticipated, we may experience losses. Also, when markets are
volatile, the assessments we have made may prove to lead to lower revenues or profits, or may lead to
losses, on the related transactions and positions. In addition, we commit capital and take market risk to
facilitate certain capital markets transactions; doing so can result in losses as well as income volatility.
Such losses may especial y occur on assets we hold for which there are not very liquid markets to begin
with. Assets that are not traded on stock exchanges or other public trading markets, such as derivatives
contracts between banks, may have values that we calculate using models other than publicly-quoted
prices. Monitoring the deterioration of prices of assets like these is difficult and could lead to losses we did
not anticipate. We can also be adversely affected if general perceptions of risk cause uncertain investors
to remain on the sidelines of the market, curtailing their activity and in turn reducing the levels of activity in
those of our businesses dependent on transaction flow.
Additionally, the current market environment is characterized by very low interest rates, particularly in the
eurozone, including negative interest yields on German government bonds. A prolonged period of low
interest rates in the eurozone or elsewhere could materially impact our net interest margin, profitability and
balance sheet deployment. While our revenues are particularly sensitive to interest rates, given the size of
our loan and deposit books denominated in Euros, the low interest rates environment can also impact
other balance sheet positions which are accounted at fair value. These current conditions, as well as any
further easing of monetary conditions, could result in a significant impact on revenues relative to our
current expectations. Actions to offset this rate impact, such as pricing changes or the introduction of
additional fees, may not be sufficient to offset this impact.
Credit ratings and access to funding: Our liquidity, business activities and profitability may be adversely
affected by an inability to access the debt capital markets or to sell assets during periods of market-wide
or firm-specific liquidity constraints. Credit rating downgrades have contributed to an increase in our
funding costs, and any future downgrade could materially adversely affect our funding costs, the
9




willingness of counterparties to continue to do business with us and significant aspects of our business
model.
We have a continuous demand for liquidity to fund our business activities. Our liquidity may be impaired
by an inability to access secured and/or unsecured debt markets, an inability to access funds from our
subsidiaries or otherwise al ocate liquidity optimally across our businesses, an inability to sell assets or
redeem our investments, or unforeseen outflows of cash or col ateral. This situation may arise due to
circumstances unrelated to our businesses and outside our control, such as disruptions in the financial
markets, or circumstances specific to us, such as reluctance of our counterparties or the market to finance
our operations due to perceptions about potential outflows resulting from litigation, regulatory and similar
matters, actual or perceived weaknesses in our businesses, our business model or our strategy, as well
as in our resilience to counter negative economic and market conditions. For example, we have
experienced steep declines in the price of our shares and increases in the spread versus government
bonds at which our debt trades in the secondary markets. Reflecting these conditions, our internal
estimates of our available liquidity over the duration of a stressed scenario have at times been negatively
impacted in recent periods. In addition, negative developments concerning other financial institutions
perceived to be comparable to us and negative views about the financial services industry in general have
also affected us in recent years. These perceptions have affected the prices at which we have accessed
the capital markets to obtain the necessary funding to support our business activities; should these
perceptions exist, continue or worsen, our ability to obtain this financing on acceptable terms may be
adversely affected. Among other things, an inability to refinance assets on our balance sheet or maintain
appropriate levels of capital to protect against deteriorations in their value could force us to liquidate
assets we hold at depressed prices or on unfavorable terms, and could also force us to curtail business,
such as the extension of new credit. This could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition
and results of operations.
In addition, we have benefited in recent years from a number of incremental measures by the ECB and
other central banks to provide additional liquidity to financial institutions and the financial markets,
particularly in the eurozone. To the extent these actions are curtailed or halted, our funding costs could
increase, or our funding supply could decrease, which could in turn result in a reduction in our business
activities. In particular, any decision by the ECB to discontinue or reduce quantitative easing or steps by
the Federal Reserve to tighten its monetary policy or actions by central banks more generally to tighten
their monetary policy will likely cause long-term interest rates to increase and accordingly impact the costs
of our funding.
Rating agencies regularly review our credit ratings, which could be negatively affected by a number of
factors that can change over time, including the credit rating agency's assessment of: our strategy and
management's capability; our financial condition including in respect of profitability, asset quality, capital,
funding and liquidity; the level of political support for the industries in which we operate; the
implementation of structural reform; the legal and regulatory frameworks applicable to our legal structure;
business activities and the rights of our creditors; changes in rating methodologies; changes in the relative
size of the loss-absorbing buffers protecting bondholders and depositors; the competitive environment,
political and economic conditions in our key markets (including the impact of Brexit); and market
uncertainty. In addition, credit ratings agencies are increasingly taking into account environmental, social
and governance factors, including climate risk, as part of the credit ratings analysis, as are investors in
their investment decisions.
Any reductions in our credit ratings, including, in particular, downgrades below investment grade, or a
deterioration in the capital markets' perception of our financial resilience could significantly affect our
access to money markets, reduce the size of our deposit base and trigger additional collateral or other
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